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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Spencer Newell Breese appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana.  On appeal, Breese challenges 
the denial of his motion to suppress. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
The state charged Breese with trafficking in marijuana after a Greyhound 
bus employee found several baggies of marijuana in Breese’s checked bag.  (R., 
pp.6-7, 18-19.)  Breese filed a motion to suppress, asserting his “backpack was 
illegally searched without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that 
a crime had been committed.”1  (R., pp.24-25.)  The court denied Breese’s 
motion after which Breese entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to 
appeal the district court’s suppression decision.  (R., pp.90-98.)  The court 
imposed a fixed one-year sentence.  (R., pp.100-103.)  Breese timely appealed 
from the judgment.  (R., pp.109-110.) 
  
                                            
1 In his motion, Breese also asserted he was “interrogated while in custody 
without being informed of his Fifth Amendment Miranda rights” (R., p.25), but he 





Breese states the issues on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Breese’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Breese failed to show error in the district court’s conclusions that 
Breese was not entitled to suppression because the Greyhound bus employee 
was not acting as an agent of law enforcement when he searched Breese’s bag 
and, even if acting as an agent of law enforcement, the search was proper under 








Breese Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
Because The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Greyhound Bus 
Employee Who Searched Breese’s Bag Was Not Acting As An Agent Of Law 




 Breese challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the 
district court erred in concluding that the Greyhound bus employee who 
searched Breese’s bag was not acting as an agent of law enforcement and, even 
if he was, the search was proper under the automobile exception.  (Appellant’s 
Brief, pp.5-15.)  The law and the evidence presented at the suppression hearing 
support both of the district court’s conclusions.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  State v. Colvin, 




C. The Search Of Breese’s Bag Was Not Protected By The Fourth 
Amendment Because It Was Not Conducted By Law Enforcement Or An 
Agent Of Law Enforcement 
 
 It is well-settled that the Fourth Amendment applies to state actors, not 
private parties, “unless government officials instigated the search or otherwise 
participated in a wrongful search.”  State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 517, 887 P.2d 
57, 62 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).  Thus, a search by an individual 
employed by a common carrier, “on its own initiative, for its own purposes, is 
normally considered a private (and not a governmental) search” that does not 
“giv[e] rise to Fourth Amendment protections.”  United States v. Gomez, 614 
F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).  “The burden of proving 
governmental involvement in a search conducted by a private citizen rests on the 
party objecting to the evidence.”  Id. (citation omitted).  The district court correctly 
concluded that the search of Breese’s bag by a Greyhound bus employee did 
not implicate the Fourth Amendment because the employee was not acting as a 
government agent when he conducted the search.  (R., pp.79-83.) 
 The district court made the following factual findings based on the 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing: 
 On April 28, 2015, Ward Eversull, a Greyhound employee, 
was arranging luggage in the luggage compartment of a bus which 
had just arrived in Boise from Portland, Oregon.  The luggage 
compartment, which is underneath the bus, is organized into six 
bins.  State’s Exh. B.  Mr. Eversull was removing from the bins the 
baggage belonging to passengers disembarking in Boise and 
rearranging the remaining baggage among the bins according to 
upcoming destinations.  As he was moving a backpack destined for 
Salt Lake City to a different bin, he noted the strong odor of 
marijuana emanating from the backpack.  Mr. Eversull testified he 
recognized the odor as marijuana because it was a [sic] “very 
distinctive . . . like a skunk.”  He further testified about his familiarity 
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with the smell of marijuana as a result of his employment with 
Greyhound.  He stated that he has had “several” occasions to smell 
the odor of marijuana in baggage over the past few years and his 
observations have been repeatedly confirmed by law enforcement 
investigations and his own searches of baggage.[2]  In addition, Mr. 
Eversull knew the bus had just arrived from Oregon, where 
marijuana is legal.  
 
 Based on his observations, Eversull locked the baggage 
compartment with the backpack inside and contacted police 
dispatch.  He specifically asked for “Officer Wall and his dogs” but 
was told Officer Wall was not available.  He then asked for another 
canine unit, reporting his discovery and explaining that the bus was 
due to depart for Salt Lake City in ten to fifteen minutes.  Def’s Exh. 
C.  
 
 Greyhound policy prohibits passengers from utilizing the 
carrier to transport illegal substances and puts passengers on 
notice of this prohibition.  Greyhound further warns its passengers 
that their “belongings and packages” are subject to being searched 
at any time.  Such notices are prominently posted at the ticketing 
counters and doors within Greyhound stations as well as in each 
passenger’s ticketing envelopes.  State’s Exh. A.  Eversull testified 
that if illegal substances are discovered during a search of 
passenger luggage, he revokes the passenger’s ticket to prevent 
continued travel with illegal substances on board. 
 
 Although Greyhound policy gave Mr. Eversull a right to 
search Defendant’s backpack without the presence of law 
enforcement, he testified that he wanted an officer present during 
[the] search for three reasons.  First, he noted his other employees 
were inside the terminal taking care of customers at the time.  
Second, he testified that he wanted law enforcement to be there 
because he is “never sure what the quantity is going to be.”[3]  
Third, the arrival of law enforcement, especially the canine unit, 
provides some degree of entertainment for the passengers and 
breaks up the routine of Eversull’s day.  Mr. Eversull is not 
                                            
2 In a footnote, the district court noted it previously “heard testimony from 
Eversull relating to one such incident in the case of State v. Lovely, CR-FE-2014-
0004550.”  (R., p.77 n.2.) 
 
3 In another footnote, the district stated:  “Implicit in Eversull’s statement is his 
discomfort if presented with a situation where he, as a private citizen, is in 
possession of a large amount of illegal contraband.”  (R., p.78 n.3.) 
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compensated by law enforcement or by Greyhound for discovering 
illegal substances.  
 
 When Cpl. Kent Lipple arrived at the Greyhound station, 
Eversull explained his findings and showed him the backpack in the 
luggage compartment, which was sitting on top of the pile of 
luggage in one of the bins.  Eversull explained to Cpl. Lipple that he 
wanted him to be a “witness” as Eversull searched the backpack, 
which he told Cpl. Lipple he had “a legal right” to do.  Cpl. Lipple 
stood outside the open door to the compartment behind Eversull 
while Eversull pointed out the backpack which was located right 
inside the door.  Cpl. Lipple then leaned over slightly to see if he 
could detect the odor of marijuana, which he could not.  Eversull, 
however, could still smell the odor.  While Cpl. Lipple passively 
observed, Eversull then picked up the backpack and manipulated 
the outside of it, stating, “I feel something right here.”  Eversull 
proceeded to open the backpack and reach in, stating, “I’ve got my 
hands on it.”  Eversull then pulled out three bags of a green leafy 
substance which he determined to be marijuana.  Cpl. Lipple then 
instructed Eversull to put the bags back into the backpack.  At no 
point prior to or during the search did Cpl. Lipple instruct Eversull to 
either search or stop searching [the] bag, nor did Cpl. Lipple touch 
the backpack or physically enter the compartment.  
 
(R., pp.77-78.)      
 In rejecting Breese’s argument that Eversull was acting as a state agent 
when he searched Breese’s bag, the district court noted the two-factor test, cited 
by the Court of Appeals in Kopsa, which requires consideration of “(1) 
government knowledge and acquiescence, and (2) the private party’s intent in 
making the search.”  (R., p.80 (quoting Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at 
62).)  With respect to the first factor, the district court found Corporal Lipple’s 
“participation in the search was minimal” and Corporal Lipple did not “direct or 
encourage Eversull to search the backpack or touch the backpack himself.”  (R., 
p.82.)  Regarding the second factor, the district court found “Eversull’s primary 
motivation for conducting the search was to pursue Greyhound’s interest in 
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deterring the transportation of illegal or dangerous substances,” and Eversull 
“was acting in accordance with Greyhound policy by searching the backpack 
when he formed the independent belief that an illegal substance was, in fact, 
being transported.”  (R., p.82.)  
 Breese contends the district court erred in applying both factors from 
Kopsa to the evidence presented in this case.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-10.)  First, 
Breese argues that because Corporal Lipple “accepted the search and allowed it 
to happen,” his conduct satisfies the dictionary definition of “acquiescence” and, 
therefore, satisfies the first factor from Kopsa.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-8.)  
Breese’s argument fails because it is premised upon how the dictionary defines 
“acquiescence” rather than the meaning behind the word as it is used in the 
context of the two-factor test.  “Knowledge and acquiescence” for purposes of 
deciding whether a private individual is acting as a state agent contemplates a 
circumstance in which the “government [is] involved either directly as a 
participant or indirectly as an encourager of the private citizen’s actions.”  Kopsa, 
126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at 62.  The cases applying the Kopsa test illustrate 
what is required in order to satisfy the first factor and support the conclusion that 
more than mere presence is required.     
 For example, in Kopsa, a Horizon Airlines employee at the airport in 
Portland, Oregon, opened a suspicious package and “found a white powdery 
substance.”  126 Idaho at 516, 887 P.2d at 61.  After discovering the contraband, 
the Horizon employee called a detective with the Portland Airport Interagency 
Narcotics Team, also known as “PAINT.”  Id.  The PAINT detective coordinated 
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with law enforcement in Boise, where the package was to be delivered, and a 
controlled delivery was arranged between law enforcement and Kopsa, to whom 
the package was addressed.  Id.  “In support of her contention that the airline 
employee acted as an agent of the state,” Kopsa argued that such a relationship 
existed because “PAINT agents introduced themselves to airline employees, 
handed out business cards to them, and left stacks of ‘profile sheets’ on the 
counters, which the employees would sometimes pass around.”  Id. at 517, 887 
P.2d at 62.  Kopsa also “point[ed] out that PAINT had previously given rewards 
of $100-200 to airline employees who provided PAINT with packages containing 
controlled substances.”  Id.  “However, the airline employee testified that she did 
not receive any training from PAINT regarding the discovery of drugs,” “she 
never saw PAINT’s profile sheet,” and, although she was aware of the past 
rewards, “she had no expectation of receiving a payment when she opened the 
package,” and “in opening the package, she was simply doing her duty as a 
citizen.”  Id. (quotations and alteration omitted).  The Idaho Court of Appeals held 
“that the government’s involvement in the search of Kopsa’s package was too 
attenuated to convert the airline employee into an agent of the state.”  Kopsa, 
126 Idaho at 518, 887 P.2d at 63.  Accordingly, “the employee’s search of 
Kopsa’s package was a private search” that did not implicate Kopsa’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.  Id.   
 In Gomez, the Ninth Circuit also rejected a claim of agency where an 
airport police officer was present when an airline employee searched a suitcase 
in order to determine the owner’s identity.  614 F.2d at 644-645.  In that case, an 
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airline employee was trying to open a suitcase that appeared to have fallen from 
a conveyor belt so he could “determine the identity of the owner, but when he 
had difficulty with the lock, one of the officers said that it merely needed to be 
tapped.”  Gomez, 614 F.2d at 644.  The officer then “tapped or kicked the 
mechanism and it released the lock.”  Id.  Once the suitcase was opened by the 
airline employee, he and the officers could see “a revolver and many small 
packages wrapped in contact paper.”  Id.  “The supervisor turned the suitcase 
over to the police” whose “further search (now prompted by discovery of the gun) 
disclosed that the packages contained 23 pounds of 70% cocaine, having a 
street value in the millions of dollars.”  Id.  The Ninth Circuit rejected Gomez’s 
claim that the search was governmental, stating: 
 The evidence supports the district judge’s finding that the 
decision to initiate the search was that of the airline employee, and 
his implicit conclusion that it was a private search when it was 
initiated.  Appellant suggests that it thereafter became a 
governmental search by the presence of the officers and their 
observation of the airline employee’s actions.  We reject that 
contention.  But in this case there was more than mere 
observation.  One of the officers tapped the suitcase and thus 
assisted the airline employee, at least to that extent.  Given the 
express findings of the district judge as to the motivation for the 
search, and his finding that the suitcase was opened by the airline 
employee pursuant to that motivation, we are not inclined to hold 
that this slight “participation” by the officer converted the clearly 
private search into a governmental one.  The officers testified that 
they were present out of an interest in helping the airline and they 
were admittedly curious.  The record contains no evidence that 
even suggests that they had information to suspect that the 
suitcase contained contraband and there is no evidence to suggest 
that they knew the owner.  We are not disposed to hold, on the 
facts of this case, that their presence and conduct constituted [sic] 
the search a governmental one, so as to bring into play the 
exclusionary rule. 
 
Gomez, 614 F.2d at 645.   
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 United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1994), on the other hand, 
illustrates a circumstance in which a private person may be found to be acting 
with “government knowledge and acquiescence” for purposes of finding agency 
under the Fourth Amendment.  In Reed, law enforcement was contacted by a 
hotel manager who reported his suspicions that Reed, a hotel guest, was using 
his room for drug activity.  15 F.3d at 929.  Officers responded to the hotel and 
accompanied the manager to Reed’s room where the manager “used his master 
key to enter.”  Id. at 930.  One of the officers “accompanied” the manager “‘ten 
feet’ into the room to assure his safety.”  Id.  While there was contraband visible 
in plain view, the room was otherwise “clean and in good condition.”  Id.  
“Nonetheless,” the manager “proceeded to go through dresser drawers and to 
open Reed’s latched briefcase.  Although the officers did not ask him to conduct 
this search, they stood guard in the doorway and listened” as the manager 
“described his finds.”  Id.  Applying the first factor of the two-factor test recited in 
Kopsa, the Ninth Circuit found the factor satisfied because the officers “definitely 
‘knew of and acquiesced’ in [the] search.”  Reed, 15 F.3d at 931.  The court 
elaborated:  “They were personally present during the search, knew exactly what 
[the manager] was doing as he was doing it, and made no attempt to discourage 
him from examining Reed’s personal belongings beyond what was required to 
protect hotel property.”  Id.  Pertinent to this conclusion was the knowledge of 
and acquiescence in conduct that was “unreasonable” or improper, i.e., “beyond 
what was required to protect hotel property.”  Id.  That the reasonableness or 
lawfulness of a challenged search is a consideration in this context is consistent 
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with the general law that the Fourth Amendment “prohibit[s] unreasonable 
intrusions by private individuals who are acting as government instruments or 
agents.”  Id.  As noted in Kopsa, “It is firmly established that evidence obtained 
through a private search, even though wrongfully conducted, is not excludable 
under the fourth amendment unless governmental officials instigated the search 
or otherwise participated in a wrongful search.”  126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at 
62.  Thus, if law enforcement instigates a search or participates in a wrongful 
search, a finding that the first factor is satisfied may be appropriate.  Such a 
finding is not appropriate in this case because the search of Breese’s bag was 
neither instigated by Corporal Lipple nor otherwise wrongful.    
 Breese does not contend, nor could he, that Corporal Lipple instigated the 
search of Breese’s bag.  Corporal Lipple was only present during the search at 
Eversull’s request and the court’s findings that Corporal Lipple did not “direct or 
encourage Eversull to search the backpack or touch the backpack himself” (R., 
p.82) are undisputed.  Eversull also does not, and could not, dispute that 
Greyhound’s policy authorized the search of the bag.  (State’s Exhibit A.)  
Indeed, Corporal Lipple had no authority to prevent Eversull from doing precisely 
what Greyhound policy allowed him to do.  Any “acquiescence” by Corporal 
Lipple was, therefore, not legally meaningful and did not convert the nature of 
the search to a governmental one.  Breese’s claim that it was “sufficient for 
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acquiescence” for Corporal Lipple to “accept[ ] the search and allow[ ] it to 
happen” is without merit.4  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.) 
 Breese’s claim that the district court erred in rejecting a finding of agency 
under the second factor also lacks merit.  Breese argues that the district court’s 
finding regarding Eversull’s motives for searching Breese’s bag “is contradicted 
by Mr. Eversull’s testimony at the suppression hearing.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  
According to Breese, “[i]t is clear” from Eversull’s testimony that he “intended to 
assist law enforcement in searching Mr. Breese’s backpack” because Eversull 
testified that he wanted law enforcement present when he opened the backpack 
because he is “never sure what the quantity is,” which makes a “difference” with 
respect to what law enforcement is “going to do with it.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-
9 (quoting Tr., p.37, L.16 – p.38, L.3).)  Why Breese wanted law enforcement 
present when he conducted the search is a different question than why he 
conducted the search in the first instance.  Eversull conducted the search 
“because Greyhound reserves the right to search any bag at any time,” and 
Eversull searched Breese’s bag in particular because it smelled like it contained 
marijuana.  (Tr., p.18, Ls.13-16, p.21, Ls.12-15.) The search was consistent with 
Greyhound’s “zero tolerance” policy, which prohibits illegal substances from 
                                            
4 Breese’s argument in this regard is also poor policy.  If an employee of a 
common carrier intends to conduct a search pursuant to a policy authorizing 
such a search, the safest course of action would be to have law enforcement 
available at the outset to manage the contraband discovered, as well as its 
owner, rather than require the employee to wait until after the search is 
conducted before calling for assistance.  
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being on its “premises or on the bus.” (State’s Exhibit A, p.2.)   
 Contrary to Breese’s claim, Eversull’s testimony, and the evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing, supports the conclusion that Eversull’s 
intent in searching Breese’s bag was pursuant to Greyhound policy and not for 
the purpose of assisting law enforcement.  Compare Kopsa, supra, and United 
States v. Humphrey, 549 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted) (“While 
a private motive need not be lawful or legitimate in order to render a search or 
seizure nongovernmental, the existence of a legitimate motive . . . makes it 
unlikely that an allegation of a private motive is merely a subterfuge.”). 
 Breese has failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion that 
Eversull’s search of Breese’s bag did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.     
  
D. Even If Eversull Was Acting As An Agent Of Law Enforcement, The 
Search Of Breese’s Bag Was Justified By Probable Cause To Believe It 
Contained Contraband And No Warrant Was Required Pursuant To The 
Automobile Exception 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.  
“A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”  State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see also State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)).  One such exception is the 
“automobile exception,” which authorizes a warrantless search of a vehicle and 
the containers therein when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle 
contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.  California v. Acevedo, 500 
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U.S. 565, 572 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982); State 
v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999); State v. Lovely, 159 
Idaho 675, 365 P.3d 431 (Ct. App. 2016).  The automobile exception applies to 
common carriers like a Greyhound bus.  Lovely, 159 Idaho at 433-434, 365 P.3d 
at ___.  “Probable cause is established if the facts available to the officer at the 
time of the search would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that 
the area or items to be searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime.”  
State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 823).  “If probable cause justifies the search of a 
lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its 
contents that may conceal the object of the search.”  Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.   
Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case supports 
the district court’s conclusion that the search of Breese’s bag was justified under 
the automobile exception based on probable cause to believe that Breese’s bag, 
which was stored in the bus, contained marijuana.  (R., pp.83-86.)  Breese 
claims otherwise, arguing that “[t]he fact that Mr. Eversull allegedly smelled 
marijuana did not establish probable cause for the search because Mr. Eversull 
was not trained in drug detection and because Officer Lipple did not detect an 
odor of marijuana.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-11.)  Breese’s argument fails for 
several reasons.   
First, Eversull did not “allegedly” smell marijuana, he in fact smelled it, and 
the district court found as much.  (R., p.86.)   
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Second, it is unclear what Breese means when he complains that Eversull 
was “not trained in drug detection” or what training he believes is required in 
order to be able to detect the odor of marijuana.  Eversull testified that he 
recognizes the odor of marijuana “[b]ecause marijuana has a very distinct odor to 
it.”  (Tr., p.34, Ls.17-20; see also p.36, Ls.13-16.)  Eversull also testified that, on 
prior occasions, his suspicion that a bag contained marijuana based on its smell 
has been confirmed by his own searches and by deployment of a drug dog.  (Tr., 
p.36, Ls.5-9.)  Eversull’s testimony was more than adequate to provide 
foundation for his belief that Breese’s bag contained marijuana.  See United 
States v. Pond, 523 F.2d 210, 211-212 (2nd Cir. 1975) (“reliable informant’s 
detection of marijuana using his sense of smell alone” was sufficient to provide 
probable cause for a search warrant).   
Moreover, as noted by the district court, Breese “did not object to 
Eversull’s testimony or challenge Eversull’s observations, nor his past 
experiences successfully identifying marijuana and his ultimate testimony that he 
recognized the smell coming from the backpack as marijuana.”  (R., p.86.)  To 
the extent Breese is trying to make a foundation objection for the first time on 
appeal, it is not preserved and this Court should decline to consider it.  Slack v. 
Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 922, 104 P.3d 958, 964 (2004) (“Because Kelleher did 
not object on the ground that there was no foundation showing that the dirt road 
was a safer route open for public use, we will not consider that objection on 
appeal.”).        
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Third, to the extent Breese is arguing, as he did below, that, as a matter of 
law, the odor of marijuana must be detected by a member of law enforcement in 
order to establish probable cause, even when the defendant is making a claim of 
agency, such an argument is without merit.  Two established legal principles 
support this conclusion: (1) “The smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the 
probable cause requirement for a warrantless search,” State v. Gonzales, 117 
Idaho 518, 519, 789 P.2d 206, 207 (Ct. App. 1990) (quotations and citations 
omitted, emphasis original); and (2) law enforcement may rely on information 
provided by citizens for purposes of establishing probable cause, State v. Van 
Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted).  
The second principle is even more significant when a defendant, like Breese, is 
claiming that the citizen is acting as an agent of law enforcement.  If Eversull’s 
acts are going to be attributable to law enforcement, his experience in detecting 
marijuana should be as well.  This is especially true where, as here, the evidence 
in the record is that Eversull had experience in detecting the odor of marijuana, 
but there is no evidence regarding Corporal Lipple’s training or experience in this 
regard.  Nevertheless, Breese asks this Court to reject the evidence that Eversull 
could smell marijuana, and had a greater opportunity to detect the odor than did 
Corporal Lipple (R., p.86 n.10) in favor of an assumption that Corporal Lipple 
had relevant training and experience and a superior marijuana-smelling ability to 
Eversull in order to take advantage of Corporal Lipple’s initial inability to detect 
the odor.  Breese’s request to decide this case on such an assumption is not 
only inconsistent with the legal principles set forth above, it is inconsistent with 
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appellate standards of review.  See State v. Vierra, 125 Idaho 465, 468, 872 
P.2d 728, 731 (Ct. App. 1994) (noting appellate review “is limited to the 
evidence, theories and arguments that were presented to the trial court below”).     
The district court correctly concluded that, even if Eversull was acting as 
an agent of law enforcement, there was probable cause, based on Eversull’s 
detection of the odor of marijuana, to support the search of Breese’s bag, and 
the search of the bag was permissible pursuant to the automobile exception.  
Breese has failed to show any error in this conclusion, or any other conclusion 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the 
district court’s order denying Breese’s motion to suppress.  
 DATED this 3rd day of May, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___ 
 JESSICA M. LORELLO 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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